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Abstract 
 
 
 
 This study examines technologies currently deployed at United States seaport points of 
entry to enable U.S. Customs (CBP) agents to inspect all entering closed containers. Analyses of 
literature published between 2002 and 2009 focuses on use, effectiveness and development of 
selected technologies, including gamma-ray and X-ray imaging, and radiation detection, as well 
as research on current screening technologies. The outcome supports CBP inspectors to detect 
dangerous cargo and minimize disruptions to the international supply chain. 
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Introduction 
Problem Area 
 Following the terrorist acts and the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 
September 11, 2001, the recognition of the threat that a nuclear or radiological device could be 
smuggled inside a cargo container lead some members of Congress to request that the United 
States Customs Service do closed inspections of all containers entering through the country’s 
seaports (U.S. House of Representatives, P.L. 107-295, 107th Congress, 2002). In response, the 
Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE) Act (House of Representatives, H.R. 4954, 
109th Congress, 2006) signed by President George W. Bush, authorized the development of high 
technology inspection equipment that would enable United States Customs agents to check cargo 
containers for dangerous materials without opening them. 
 Kennedy (2008) states that the ubiquitous use and high importance of information 
technology to handle the transportation of goods and materials through our seaports has added a 
new dimension to our homeland security and data security. These systems also provide the 
means for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to track and inspect cargoes to ensure 
that materials potentially hazardous to safety and well-being are not entering into the United 
States without their knowledge (Kennedy, 2008). 
 According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), (2006), there are various 
technologies currently being deployed at U.S. ports and at a few selected ports around the world. 
The deployment involves a combination of existing technology and proven nuclear detection 
devices to six foreign ports: Port Qasim in Pakistan; Puerto Cortes in Honduras; Southampton in 
the United Kingdom; Port Salalah in Oman; Port of Singapore; and the Gamman Terminal at 
Port Busan in Korea (DHS, 2006).   
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Purpose  
 To address and minimize the disruption to the international supply chain, (Peterson & 
Treat, 2008) state that “the events of 9/11 precipitated a change in cargo security measures at 
national borders” (p.3). The purpose of this study is guided by two concepts provided by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). These include (a) to document the technologies 
currently being used in support of closed container inspections (Stana, 2006), and (b) identify the 
companies and organizations leading research efforts on developing new technologies (Stana, 
2006). A third concept provided by Bakshi, Flynn and Gans (2009) is also used to guide the 
purpose of the study, which is (c) to examine the impact of technology deployment in relation to 
a set of pre-selected criteria, including the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed 
container inspections. 
For example, in relation to documenting technologies in use, there are two primary types 
of technologies currently available on the market that can perform non-intrusive cargo 
inspection. The first uses a radiological source to generate gamma rays, which pass 
through/interact with the container to be inspected, providing a picture of the contents. The 
second type of technology uses a radiation machine (an x-ray generator or linear accelerator) to 
electrically generate and emit x-rays, which perform the same function as do the gamma rays 
(SAIC, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
   Port Security Technology 13 
 
Significance  
 The issue of port security and how it affects the international supply chain flow is related 
to manufacturing and logistics operations (Sarathy, 2006). For example, the majority of Aurora 
Networks products are manufactured and supplied by vendors in the Asia Pacific (APAC) 
countries. The products are moved in cargo containers (Aurora imports two to three containers a 
month) and shipped into the port of Oakland, CA. The availability of faster screening technology 
at the ports mean cargos are cleared faster and delivered to the warehouse (Bottan, 2009).  
Port screening technology plays an important role in the international supply chain, and 
adversely affects operations at many U.S. companies (Rice, 2003). Seaports are the backbone of 
the worldwide commercial traffic (Maritime Security, 2007). The rapid growth of maritime trade 
creates a continuing need to expand seaports and provide high-quality services (Maritime 
Security, 2007). At the same time, technological, regulatory, security, and economic trends are 
placing new demands on seaports and cargo screening technologies (Maritime Security, 2007).  
 According to Banamyong (2005), security measures are necessary to guarantee the 
protection of global supply chains against acts of terrorism or any possible unexpected threats. 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued a layered approach to port security 
intended to ensure the integrity of the supply chain from the point of container loading to the 
arrival in the United States without hindering the flow of commerce through ports (Langhoff & 
Pillai, 2007). Under the layered security system, the United States Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) determines risk by carefully analyzing various data sources including ship and 
cargo manifest information on shippers and cargo points of origin, as well as classified 
intelligence.  These capabilities provide CBP and other federal agencies the intelligence they 
need to make informed decisions regarding the level of cargo risk, determine which merit 
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additional scanning and investigation, and help get information to the field personnel (Langhoff 
& Pillai, 2007).   
 
Audience  
 The intended audiences for this literature review are professionals with an interest in 
movement of goods and potential disruptions to the international supply chain. These 
professionals are involved with exports and imports, as described below.  
 Exports. Traffic managers, shipping and receiving specialist, and freight forwarders are 
engaged in the business of exporting products out of the United States, and dealing with the 
maze of regulations associated with exporting goods out of the United States. The compliance 
and regulatory issues by the various U.S. government agencies affect and impact international 
trade between the United States and other nations. It is important for exporters to stay updated 
and informed on regulations by agencies such as the Department of Commerce (DOC) and other 
federal agencies that may affect their logistics supply chain. 
 Imports. Customs brokers, clearing agents, logistics planners, purchasing, and 
manufacturing managers all have an interest in movement of goods and potential disruptions to 
the international supply chain. The primary issue is that of time; the time it takes to get their 
products from their international suppliers to their factories and warehouses, and what role port 
security plays in the supply chain. 
Outcome 
 The study is intended as a guide to professionals engaged in the arena of exports and 
imports, and international logistics. This guide covers security screening of inbound cargo 
containers at foreign ports and at United States points of entry, with focus on materials that could 
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be used to make atomic weapons or other instruments of weapons of mass destruction, including 
biological and chemical weapons. Manufacturing managers, purchasing managers, trade 
specialist and planners need to understand that these inspections may cause delays, and affect the 
logistics flow of goods which may impact their businesses. Under these conditions, time 
reliability is very important. An industry under tight schedule operations (just in time (JIT) 
supply chains) cannot afford delays on delivery (Banomyong, 2005). 
 
Delimitations 
 Focus. The study focuses specifically on technologies for screening inbound cargo 
containers destined for, and at United States seaports of entry for materials that could be used to 
make atomic weapons or other instruments of weapons of mass destruction, including biological 
and chemical weapons. 
 The study does not provide for or cover movement of cargo between nations, the costs to 
businesses due to disruptions associated with the screening process other than its effect on delays 
to the international supply chain. A significant limitation associated with the screening is the lack 
of direct control of outbound cargo destined for United States seaports. Specifically, this pertains 
to the cooperation of foreign governments, and the issue of national sovereignty hinders and 
limits the desire of the United States Customs Service to place its officers, inspectors and 
inspection equipment at these foreign ports. To address this, the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI) program was developed by the United States Customs Service to encourage enhanced 
security arrangements and agreements between the United States and specific trading partners.  
 Time Frame. Prior to September 11, 2001, security was viewed as raising costs, 
undermining efficiency, and undermining reliability. Since September 11, 2001 the goal is 
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largely to retrofit some security into existing systems (Flynn, 2006). This study covers what is 
being done to ensure cargo container security post September 11, 2001, from 2002 to 2009. 
 Sources. The sources of material for the literature review are from searches done using 
EBSCO HOST Academic Search Premier, Google Scholar, FirstSearch ECO, LexisNexis 
Academic, Web of Science, and the Congressional Quarterly. Search results are focused towards 
obtaining specific information covering seaport scanning and screening technologies affiliated 
with port security technology. A wide variety of types of source material is used in this study, 
including books, journal articles, and government publications, articles in daily and weekly 
newspapers, magazine articles, and company web sites. Many of these sources are noted in the 
paper with the use of acronyms and abbreviations. An explanatory list is provided in Appendix 
A. 
 Audience. The intended audiences for this literature review are individuals engaged in 
inspecting inbound cargo containers, and those involved in the field of import, export, logistics, 
freight forwarding and customs brokerage. They include United States Customs and Border 
Protection agents and field inspectors who are responsible for screening inbound cargo 
containers, traffic managers, shipping and receiving specialist, and freight forwarders engaged in 
the business of exporting products out of the United States, and customs brokers and clearing 
agents concerned with importing into the United States. 
 
Data Analysis Plan Preview  
 The study seeks to examine cargo screening technologies at United States seaports of 
entry. The approach taken to data analysis is described as conceptual analysis by Busch, De 
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Maret, Flynn, Kellum, Le, and Meyers (2005). This process provides a research tool which can 
be used to verify the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts.  
Search on selected literature targets keywords related to detection of dangerous nuclear 
and radioactive materials in cargo containers. Keywords address the three categories described in 
the purpose of the study: (1) technologies currently being used in support of closed container 
inspections (Stana, 2006), (2) companies and organizations leading research efforts on 
developing new technologies (Stana, 2006), and (3) impact of technology deployment in relation 
to the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed container inspections (Bakshi, Flynn & 
Gans, 2009). The goal is to report how available technologies are applied most effectively to 
prevent illicit materials in cargo containers from passing through United States Customs Service 
inspections at the ports of entry.  
 
Writing Plan Preview  
 The writing plan that directs the organization of information in the Review of the 
Literature section of this paper begins with an overview of the purpose of the study and then 
examines the results of the data analysis process.  As noted in Leedy and Ormrod (2005), “begin 
your literature review from a comprehensive perspective, like an inverted pyramid – broad end 
first. Then as you proceed, you can deal with more specific ideas and studies and focus in more 
and more on your own particular problem” (p.79). In this case, a thematic approach is taken 
(UNC, 1998) as a way to frame the outcome of this study – a guide on the topic of port security 
technology. Initial themes used to frame the guide are aligned with the three areas of analysis, 
including (1) technologies currently being used in support of closed container inspections for 
materials that could be used to make atomic weapons or other instruments of weapons of mass 
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destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, (2) companies and organizations leading 
research efforts on developing new technologies, and (3) the impact of technology deployment in 
relation to the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed container inspections. 
Additional themes may emerge during the data analysis process. 
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Definitions  
 Lester and Lester (2007), state that “the definition must interpret the term as it used in 
relation to the researcher’s project” (p.56). The goal of this section and the terms defined provide 
an insight into the subject of this study on port security technologies. The terms are defined to 
align with the purpose of the study, and are also a guide in understanding materials presented in 
the study. 
 
Container Inspection System: The container/vehicle inspection systems comprise 3 major 
series: the fixed, the mobile and the reloadable systems. They are designed for the customs 
service to inspect cargo containers without opening them (China National Aero Technology 
Company, 2009)  
Container Scanning Technology: The term ‘‘scan’’ means utilizing nonintrusive imaging 
equipment, radiation detection equipment, or both, to capture data, including images of a 
container (Cirincione, R., Cosmas, A., Low, C., Pech, J., & Wilds, J., 2007). 
Container Screening Technology: The container screening device (CSD) is the tool for 
checking for materials that can be used to build weapons of mass destruction, concealed 
contraband and illegal substances, and identifying fraudulently labeled containers (Department 
of Energy, 2009).  
Container Security Device: The container security device snaps into the door jamb of a 
container and indicates when the container door has been opened. The device can easily 
accommodate the addition of light, chemical, and/or radiation sensors (Customs and Border 
Protection Today, 2003). 
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Container Security Initiative: The fundamental objective of the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI) is to engage both so-called 'mega-ports' (ports sending the highest volume of ocean going 
container traffic into the United States) and the national governments where these ports are 
located in a way that will facilitate the pre-screening of outbound containers destined to the 
United States (Banomyong, 2003). 
Examination: CBP defines an “examination” as a physical inspection of a conveyance and/or 
the imaging of a conveyance, using large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology 
(Customs and Border Protection.gov). 
Homeland Security: Homeland Security leverages resources within federal, state, and local 
governments, coordinating the transition of multiple agencies and programs into a single, 
integrated agency focused on protecting the American people and their homeland (Department of 
Homeland Security.gov).  
International Supply Chain: The transport and logistics system (organizations, people, 
technology, activities, information and resources) for the world's cargo. The international supply 
chain encompasses manufacturing, procurement and distribution, and involves multiple 
enterprises, including suppliers, manufacturers and retailers who work together to meet a 
customer need for a product or service (Canadian Border Services Agency.gc.ca). 
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology: Active, non-intrusive interrogation technologies are 
inspection systems that take advantage of an externally applied “source” to perform traditional 
imaging of, or to stimulate characteristic emissions from, an inspected object (Jones, 2003). 
Port Security: The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from 
internal threats such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, as well 
as accidents, thefts, or other causes of similar nature (DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, 2009). 
   Port Security Technology 21 
 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis: A system that uses a nanosecond pulsed beam of fast neutrons 
to interrogate the contents of small volume elements – voxels – of a cargo container or truck 
(Brown, Coates, Kuo, Loverman, Pentaleri & Rynes, 2004) 
Scintillator: Material that emits light when particles traverse it (Lawrence Berkeley Labs, 2009). 
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Research Parameters 
 
 This section describes the methods used in conducting the study. It covers the research 
questions, the search strategy, search process documentation, and the search results. Also 
presented are the approaches to data collection, reference evaluation, and the detailed approaches 
to data analysis and data presentation. 
 This study is designed as a literature review. “A review of literature presents a set of 
summaries in essay form for two purposes; it helps you investigate the topic because it forces 
you to examine and then describe how each source addresses the problem, and it organizes and 
classifies the sources in some reasonable manner for the benefit of the reader” (Lester & Lester, 
2007, p. 65 ).  
 
Research Questions 
          Main Question. How effective are selected deployed technologies in the detection of 
illegal and dangerous cargo in unopened containers at US seaport entry points? (Department of 
Homeland Security.gov). 
Sub-Questions. 
• What are the key types of technology in use? (Department of Homeland Security and Port 
Security Council, 2009). 
• How is the deployed technology being used (Customs and Border Protection.gov)? 
• What is the impact of the use of this technology on cargo international supply chain logistics 
management (Banomyong, 2005). 
• What is the impact of the use of this technology on illegal container detection? (Keefer, 2008). 
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• Which organizations are leading the research effort to develop additional technologies in 
support of closed container inspection, and how are they being funded (Department of Homeland 
Security and Port Security Council, 2009). 
 
Search Strategy 
 Search terms. The following key search terms were derived from articles, books and 
journals while conducting a search of available literature for the proposed topic. Search results 
are reported in Appendix B and evaluated as to quality. Poor means inadequate useful sources, 
fair is a selected few useful article, good means a number of useful and related articles, and 
excellent means the articles found cover the search term. Search terms include: 
Container Inspection System 
Container Port Security  
Container Scanning Technology 
Container Screening Technology 
Container Security Initiative 
Homeland Security 
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology 
Scanning Systems 
 
Evaluation Criteria 
 The evaluation of available material for the study is focused on the resources available 
and its appropriateness for the research. Phillips (2008) offers suggestions for evaluating a range 
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of resources, including books, articles and websites. It covers suitability – scope, audience and 
timeliness, and discusses scholarly journals versus popular magazines (Phillips, 2008). 
 A scholarly journal is generally one that is published by and for experts (Phillips, 2008). 
For this study, a number of peer reviewed journals are examined that focus on research work 
being done on technologies that can detect nuclear, chemical and biological materials that can be 
used to make illicit and weapons of mass destruction. These researchers at institutions and 
organizations such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, Science Applications 
International Corporation, the Idaho National laboratories and the University of California at 
Berkeley are widely acknowledged experts in their fields, and provide content and scope in these 
journals that relate to the topic covered in the review. 
 Popular magazines range from highly respected publications to general interest 
newsmagazines (Phillips, 2008). For this study, scientific publications accessed through 
searches, for example, in the Web of Science, provided valuable data on current technologies 
being used in scanning cargo containers. 
 All of the relevant literature reviewed covered research work and publication done after 
2001. The quality of the articles selected had to be relevant to the topic, well-organized, and 
provide information on data that is clear and descriptive. 
 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
 The data analysis focuses on addressing the three categories described in the purpose of 
the study. Content is reviewed in terms of the presence of specific terms and narratives. There 
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are two goals: to look for patterns among the data, and to look for patterns that give meaning to 
the study (Busch, De Maret, Flynn, Kellum, Meyers, Saunders, White, & Palmquist, 2005).  
Step 1: Level of analysis. Search on selected literature targets keywords and a set of 
keywords related to detection of dangerous nuclear and radioactive materials in cargo containers, 
such as “non-intrusive inspection”.  
Step 2: Number of concepts. Keywords address the three categories described in the 
purpose of the study: (1) technologies currently being used in support of closed container 
inspections (Stana, 2006), (2) companies and organizations leading research efforts on 
developing new technologies (Stana, 2006), and (3) impact of technology deployment in relation 
to the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed container inspections (Bakshi, Flynn & 
Gans, 2009). Words or set of words associated with the categories outlined above will be coded. 
Step 3: Coding approach. The goal is to report how available technologies are applied 
most effectively to prevent illicit materials in cargo containers from passing through United 
States Customs Service inspections at the ports of entry. Coding will be done for the existence of 
keywords, such as “non-intrusive inspection” regardless of how many times it many appear in 
the collected literature. 
Step 4: Level of generalization. Concepts that are coded and appear to be the same or 
similar will be regarded as the same. As an example, “container scanning technology” and 
“container screening technology”; “container security initiative” and “homeland security”; “non-
intrusive inspection” and “container inspection system” will be recorded as the same. Words that 
are similar but have different implicit meaning will be coded separately. 
Step 5: Translation rules. Translation rules ensure consistency and coherence by 
streamlining and organizing the coding process. As an example, “scanning system” is coded 
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under “container scanning technology” and “container screening technology” and having this 
rule allows for consistency throughout the study. 
Step 6: Irrelevant information. Irrelevant information will be ignored for the purpose of 
this study. 
Step 7: Code the texts. Coding will be done manually by posting words on markers, 
reading the text, posting the markers to sections that contain key concepts that are relevant to the 
study, and then transferring the information onto a worksheet. The worksheet will be organized 
to reflect each concept, terms, article and author’s names. 
Step 8: Analyze results. Upon completing of the coding, data is examined and an attempt 
is made to reach possible conclusions based on themes presented in the study. 
 
Writing Plan 
 The writing plan that directs the organization of information in the Review of the 
Literature section of this paper begins with an overview of the purpose of the study and then 
examines the results of the data analysis process. In this case, a thematic approach is taken 
(UNC, 1998), as a way to frame the outcome of this study – a guide on the topic of port security 
technology. Initial themes used to frame the guide are aligned with the three areas of analysis, 
including (1) technologies currently being used in support of closed container inspections for 
materials that could be used to make atomic weapons or other instruments of weapons of mass 
destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, (2) companies and organizations leading 
research efforts on developing new technologies, and (3) the impact of technology deployment in 
relation to the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed container inspections. 
Additional themes may emerge during the data analysis process. 
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 Theme 1: Technologies in current use to support closed container inspections. The 
analysis of these technologies is based upon research of available information and provides an 
introduction to each of these technologies, their capabilities, efficacy, associated standards and 
benefits and the trends and policies driving their use. A number of technology vendors are 
researched as part of the technologies currently being used in support of closed container 
inspections for materials that could be used to make atomic weapons or other instruments of 
weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons. Non-intrusive 
inspection (NII), radiation detection, and RFID container intrusion detection have been the 
technologies at the center of currently deployed technologies and its utilization in a port 
environment are examined. 
Theme 2: Companies and organizations leading research efforts. Companies and 
organizations leading research efforts on developing new technologies address issues such as 
enhancing the technological differences between the available systems currently in use, and 
working on technologies not only designed to detect or identify the radiation, but also to 
determine the nature and type of device detected in the scanned cargo container.  
 Theme 3: The impact of technology deployment. The impact of technology deployment 
in relation to the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed container inspections focuses 
on how effective the deployed technology has assisted the United States Customs and Border 
inspectors in detecting illicit cargo, and its impact on the international supply chain. Deployed 
technology is reviewed for operational and optimization standards and comparison are made on 
detection methods for efficiency. With the deployments, there are associated port security 
infrastructure changes and these changes impacts the ability of ports and their terminals to 
securely and efficiently operate. 
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Annotated Bibliography 
 
This annotated bibliography is a list of citations to books, articles, and documents that 
serve as key references to the development of the study. The purpose of the annotation is to 
inform the reader of the relevance, accuracy, and quality of the sources cited (Cornell University 
Library, 2009). Lester and Lester (2007) states that an annotated bibliography does two 
important things: (1) it gives a bibliographic list of a selection of sources, and (2) it summarizes 
the contents of each book or article (p.117). 
The selection of key references used to develop this study is organized according to three 
categories aligned with the key goals of the study; current closed container inspection 
technologies in use to detect materials that could be used to make atomic weapons or other 
instruments of weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, 
research efforts and potential technologies, and areas of impact of the deployed technology. Each 
entry includes the bibliographic citation and an annotation, in the form of an abstract, pulled 
from the original reference. A brief description of how the reference is used to inform this study 
is also included, as well as how the credibility of the study is determined. 
 
Current Closed Container Inspection Technologies 
Brown, D., Coates, A., Kuo, S., Loveman, R., Penttaleri, E., & Rynes, J. (1997)   
Cargo inspection system based on pulsed fast neutron analysis, Proceedings 
Of SPIE, The International Society of Optical Engineers, 2936 (76) 1997. Retrieved from 
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=17419023 
Abstract: The pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) cargo inspection system (CIS) uses a 
nanosecond pulsed beam of fast neutrons to interrogate the contents of small volume 
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elements -- voxels -- of a cargo container or truck. A color display shows the three-
dimensional location of suspected contraband, such as drugs or explosives. The neutrons 
interact with the elemental contents of each vowel, and gamma rays characteristic of the 
elements are collected in an array of detectors. The elemental signals and their ratios give 
unique signatures for drugs and other contraband. From the time of arrival of the gamma 
rays, the position of the vowel within the truck is determined. The PFNA CIS is designed 
to scan five or more trucks per hour. The operator interface has been designed to assist in 
the rapid identification of drugs, explosives or other contraband. 
Comments: What is unique about the PFNA is that the technology offers real time 
detection and the location of contraband or explosives hidden inside the cargo container. 
The PNFA highlights technology currently being used to scan cargo containers, and its 
ability to scan five or more containers per hour will enhance the supply chain and aid in 
speeding inspections at the ports. The article, published in a peer reviewed journal, is 
relevant to the study as support for the development of the Significance of this study. 
Jones, J., (2003). Active, non-intrusive inspection technologies for homeland 
 defense. Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, 
 Retrieved from  
 http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/Documents/2585364.pdf 
Abstract: Active, non-intrusive inspection or interrogation technologies have been used 
for over 100 years with the primary focus being radiographic imaging. During the last 50 
years, various active interrogation systems have been investigated and most have 
revealed many unique and interesting capabilities and advantages that have already 
benefited the general public. Unfortunately, except for medical and specific industrial 
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applications, these unique capabilities have not been widely adopted, largely due to the 
complexity of the technology, the overconfident reliance on passive detection systems to 
handle most challenges, and the unrealistic public concerns regarding radiation safety 
issues for a given active inspection deployment. The unique homeland security 
challenges facing the United States today are inviting more “out-of-the-box” solutions 
and are demanding the effective technological solutions that only active interrogation 
systems can provide. While revolutionary new solutions are always desired, these 
technology advancements are rare, and when found, usually take a long time to fully 
understand and implement for a given application. What’s becoming more evident is that 
focusing on under developed, but well understood, active inspection technologies can 
provide many of the needed “out-of-the-box” solutions. This paper presents a brief 
historical overview of active interrogation. It identifies some of the major homeland 
defense challenges being confronted and the commercial and research technologies 
presently available and being pursued.  
Comments: Radiation sources and emissions are discussed in this paper and detection 
methods are fully covered. Various inspection methods and technologies are discussed, 
along with the companies that manufacture imaging, explosion detection and nuclear 
material detection equipment. The Idaho National laboratory is a leading and recognized 
research organization that is funded by the U.S. government. Technologies discussed 
such as the explosive and nuclear material detection discussed are part of the current 
technologies being deployed for cargo screening and inspections. The reference is part of 
the data set for coding, and provides information presented in the Review of the 
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Literature section of the paper. It is also relevant to the study as it covers key terms in 
detail, such as non-intrusive technology. 
 
Orphan, V., Muenchau, E., Gormley, J. & Richardson, R. (2005). Advanced y ray 
 technology for scanning cargo containers. Applied Radiation and Isotopes, 
 63 (5/6), 723-732. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6TJ0-4GHBP6P-
5&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_search
StrId=1139005403&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersio
n=0&_userid=10&md5=1909986267ea9f48154d13c9ed1b4ca1\ 
Abstract: The shipping industry is striving to increase security for cargo containers 
without significantly impeding traffic. Three Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) development programs are supporting this effort. SAIC''s ICIS 
system combines SAIC''s VACIS γ ray imaging, radiation scanning, OCR, elemental 
analysis and other technologies to scan containers for nuclear materials and other hazards 
in normal terminal traffic. SAIC''s enhanced γ ray detector improves VACIS image 
resolution by a factor of three. And SAIC''s EmptyView software analyzes VACIS 
images to automatically verify empty containers. 
Comments:  SAIC’s scanning technology is currently being deployed at various ports 
across the United States, including the ports of Los Angeles, San Diego, Oakland and 
Seattle. What is unique about this technology is that it produces radiographic images of 
cargo containers and vehicles in less than a minute. Science Application International 
Corporation is one of the leading manufacturers of cargo screening and scanning 
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technology in the United States. As mentioned above, SAIC systems are currently being 
deployed at seaports across the country. This article is published in a peer reviewed 
journal. It is part of the data set for coding, and provides information about current 
technologies being deployed, as reported in the Review of the Literature section of the 
paper. These three researchers at SAIC are widely recognized as experts in the field of 
scanning technology. 
 
Redus, R., Alioto, M., Sperry, D. & Pantazis, T. (2007). VeriTainer radiation detector  
for intermodal shipping containers. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics 
Research A, 579 (1), 384–387. Retrieved from 
http://www.amptek.com/pdf/gradpaper.pdf 
Abstract: The VeriSpreaderTM radiation detection system uses neutron and 
spectroscopic g-ray detectors into a container crane spreader bar, the part of the crane that 
directly engages the intermodal shipping containers while moving from ship to shore and 
vice versa. The use of a spectroscopic g-detector reduces the rate of nuisance alarms due 
to naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). The combination of g and neutron 
detection reduces the effectiveness of shielding and countermeasures.  
Comments: VeriTainer’s container crane mounted radiation detection and identification 
system employs advanced passive scanning technology and sophisticated identification 
algorithms to detect and identify gamma and neutron sources in shipping containers as 
they are loaded or discharged from a container ship. The VeriTainer radiation detection 
system is currently being used at the Port of Oakland, California. The article, written by 
Veritainer researchers, is published in the peer reviewed journal. It is part of the data set 
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for coding, and highlights another cargo scanning device being deployed at United States 
seaports, as reported in the Review of the Literature section of the paper. 
 
Research Efforts and Potential Technologies 
Gozani, T. (2007). Principles and applications of neutron-based inspection techniques. 
 Nuclear Instruments & Methods in Physics Research, 261 (1-2), 311-315. 
 Retrieved from 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/P1433_CD/datasets/papers/ap_int-
04.pdf 
Abstract. Neutron based explosive inspection systems can detect a wide variety of 
substances of importance, for a variety of purposes from national security threats (e.g., 
nuclear materials, explosives, narcotics) to customs duties, shipment control and 
validation, and for protection of the environment. The inspection is generally founded on 
the nuclear interactions of the neutrons with the various nuclides present and the 
detection of resultant characteristic emissions. These can be discrete gamma lines 
resulting from the thermal (n,γ) neutron capture process or inelastic neutron scattering 
(n,n´γ) occurring with fast neutrons.  
The two types of reactions are generally complementary. The capture process provides 
energetic and highly penetrating gamma rays in most inorganic substances and in 
hydrogen, while fast neutron inelastic scattering provides relatively strong gamma-ray 
signatures in light elements such as carbon and oxygen. In some specific important cases, 
though, unique signatures are provided by the neutron capture process in light elements 
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such as nitrogen, where unusually high energy gamma rays are produced. This forms the 
basis for key explosive detection techniques. 
The detection of nuclear materials, both fissionable (e.g., 238U) and fissile (e.g., 235U), 
are generally based on the fissions induced by the probing neutrons and detecting one or 
more of the unique signatures of the fission process. These include prompt and delayed 
neutrons and prompt and delayed gamma rays. These signatures are not discrete in energy 
(typically they are continua) but temporally and energetically significantly different from 
the background, thus making them readily distinguishable. 
Comments: This is a journal review covering recent advances in neutron based explosive 
inspection systems. The review covers just one of the technologies being deployed. It is 
part of the data set for coding. It is relevant to the study because it highlights research 
work being done to enhance current technologies, and the neutron based systems can 
detect a variety of illicit cargo, as reported in the Review of the Literature section of the 
paper. 
Hazi, A. (2005). Screening cargo containers to remove a terrorist threat.  
 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, United States Department 
 Of Energy. Retrieved from 
 http://uolibraries.worldcat.org/oclc/316318762&referer=brief_results 
Abstract:  Improving security at U.S. ports is thus one of the nation's most difficult 
technical and practical challenges because the systems developed for screening cargo 
must operate in concert with ongoing seaport activities. Working at this intersection of 
commerce and national security, Lawrence Livermore researchers are applying their 
expertise in radiation science and detection to develop improved technologies for 
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detecting hidden radioactive materials. One new technology being designed and tested at 
the Laboratory is a neutron interrogation system for cargo containers. This system will 
quickly screen incoming shipments to ensure that nuclear materials such as plutonium 
and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not smuggled into the United States. 
Comments: This research work at the Lawrence Livermore laboratories is relevant to this 
study because it provides detailed analysis on work being done to detect plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium in cargo containers. With a focus on detecting the gamma-ray 
signature and on projects such as the liquid scintillator, this research addresses the sub 
questions of key technologies in use and organizations leading the research effort. It is 
part of the data set for coding, and provides information reported in the Review of the 
Literature section of the paper. 
 
Im, H. & Song, K.  (2006). Applications of prompt gamma ray neutron activation 
 analysis: Detection of illicit materials. Applied Spectroscopy Reviews 
 44 (4), 317-334. Retrieved from  
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/laps/2009/00000044/00000004/art00002 
Abstract: Prompt gamma ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA) is an efficient 
nondestructive multi-elemental detection technique for samples such as metals, coal 
(mineral), cement, and radioactive materials as well as for explosives, chemical warfare 
agents, various narcotics, land mines, etc. The technique can be used in the laboratory or 
for on-site analysis for various samples. In addition, the PGNAA technique in elemental 
analysis can provide more accurate detection results with low false alarm in variety of 
application fields when combined with image scanning and chemometric treatment of the 
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obtained data. The development of small-sized neutron generators enabled and widened 
these applications because a stationary nuclear reactor is no longer an indispensible 
element in PGNAA. 
Comments: The bulk of the research on prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis is 
on the elimination of much of the background spectrum and pulse pileup. This leads to an 
increase in the signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio, and enables measurement of emission rates of 
characteristic prompt gamma rays produced by neutron capture. This research, published 
in a peer reviewed journal, is relevant to the study as it covers a key component of the 
primary technology mentioned in the purpose of the study. It is part of the data set for 
coding, and provides information reported in the Review of the Literature section of the 
paper. 
Johnson, A., Volberding, W. & Reiter, R. (2004). ARPA nonintrusive cargo 
 inspection technology testbed. Analytical Systems Engineering Corp. 
 Retrieved from  
http://spiedl.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=PSISDG0022760000
01000192000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes&ref=no 
Abstract: The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Nonintrusive [Cargo] 
Inspection Technology Testbed, located in the port of Tacoma, Washington, began 
operation on 21 May 1993. The testbed is a part of the Department of Defense 
Counterdrug Research and Development Program. It is used to evaluate the ability of 
existing inspection technologies, as well as new technologies and prototype systems, to 
detect contraband, primarily drugs, hidden in large intermodal cargo containers and 
vehicles without the need to open them or manually remove the cargo. Currently, a dual-
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image, high-energy radiographic imaging system and an advanced information processing 
and display system are being evaluated at the testbed. Work is under way to install and 
begin testing of a pulsed fast neutron analysis cargo inspection system in early 1995. The 
testbed can also accommodate other sensors such as particle/vapor detection systems. The 
testbed was designed, constructed, and is now operated for ARPA by Analytical Systems 
Engineering Corporation. This paper provides a brief overview of the testbed, the high-
energy radiographic imaging system, the information processing and display system, and 
the test program. 
Comments: Research and test conducted at the port of Tacoma, Washington as part of 
ARPA’s development program adds another dimension to container screening 
technology. The involvement of the Department of Defense (DOD) in this project 
highlights the cooperation between the DOD and private enterprises in advancing work 
on non-intrusive cargo inspections systems. This non-scholarly article is part of the data 
set for coding, and provides information on available resources for testing of research 
work being done on cargo screening technology, reported in the Review of the Literature 
section of the paper. 
 
Jones, J., Norman, D., Haskell, K., Sterbentz, J., Yoon, W., Watson, S., 
 Johnson, J., Zabriskie, J., Bennett, B., Watson, R., Moss, C. & Frank, H. 
 (2006) Detection of shielded nuclear material in a cargo container. Nuclear  
 Instruments & Methods in Physics Research Section A, 562(2), 1085-1088. 
Retrieved from 
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=17855751 
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Abstract: The Idaho National Laboratory, along with Los Alamos National Laboratory 
and the Idaho State University’s Idaho Accelerator Center, are developing electron 
accelerator-based, photonuclear inspection technologies for the detection of shielded 
nuclear material within air-, rail-, and especially, maritime-cargo transportation 
containers. This paper describes a developing prototypical cargo container inspection 
system utilizing the Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) technology, incorporates 
interchangeable, well-defined, contraband shielding structures (i.e., “calibration” pallets) 
providing realistic detection data for induced radiation signatures from smuggled nuclear 
material, and provides various shielded nuclear material detection results. Using a 4.8-kg 
quantity of depleted uranium, neutron and gamma-ray detection responses are presented 
for well-defined shielded and unshielded configurations evaluated in a selected cargo 
container inspection configuration. 
Comments: The article in this peer-reviewed journal highlights work by researchers at 
the Idaho National laboratories on advances in gamma-ray detection system in order to 
utilize photon signatures to detect nuclear material inside a shielded container. It covers 
detection characterization, normalization factors, and numerical simulations and 
experiments are documented. It is part of the data set for coding, and provides 
information on the Idaho laboratory, which is one of the organizations leading research 
efforts in advancing cargo screening technologies, reported in the Review of the 
Literature section of the paper. 
 
Leahy-Hoppa, M. & Fitch, M. & Osiander, R. (2009). Terahertz spectroscopy techniques  
 for explosive detection. Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry, 395(2), 247-257. 
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 Retrieved from http://www.springerlink.com/content/212344k64558633r/ 
Abstract: Spectroscopy in the terahertz frequency range has demonstrated unique 
identification of both pure and military-grade explosives. There is significant potential for 
wide applications of the technology for nondestructive and nonintrusive detection of 
explosives and related devices. Terahertz radiation can penetrate most dielectrics, such as 
clothing materials, plastics, and cardboard. This allows both screening of personnel and 
through-container screening. The capabilities of the technology to detect and identify 
explosives highlight some of the critical works in this area. 
Comments: Timely research work that addresses an area that needs more attention; the 
detection and identification of explosives in cargo containers. Its application will be 
useful beyond the seaport, and will serve the dual purpose of air cargo and airline 
passenger screening. This research work, published in a peer reviewed journal, is relevant 
to the study because it highlights the importance of detecting chemical explosives. The 
recent incident of an attempted bombing of an inbound American airliner on December 
25, 2009 with explosives is an example for the need and relevance of research work in 
this area. It is part of the data set for coding, and provides information reported in the 
Review of the Literature section of the paper. 
 
Staples, E., (2006). Chemical profiling cargo with an ultra-high speed gas  
 chromatograph, ol-factory images, and virtual chemical sensors, Electronic 
 Sensor Technology, LP, Retrieved from 
 http://www.techmondial.co.uk/assets/documents/Cargo_Container_Odors.pdf 
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Abstract: Ultra-high speed gas chromatography is a powerful analytical method for 
analysis of odors, fragrances, and chemical vapors produced by explosives, chemical and 
biological weapons, contraband, and hazardous industrial materials. A portable chemical 
profiling system incorporating an ultra-high speed chromatography column, a solid-state 
sensor, a programmable gate array microprocessor, and an integrated vapor 
preconcentrator is described. 
Using ultra-high speed chromatography, chemical vapors within containers can be 
speciated and their concentration measured in less than 10 seconds with picogram 
sensitivity using a SAW sensor with electronically variable sensitivity. Odor 
concentration and intensity are measured directly with an integrating GC sensor. The 
solid-state sensor produces high resolution 2-dimensional olfactory images unique to 
many complex odors. Examples involving odors from explosives, contraband drugs of 
abuse, hazardous chemicals, and even biological life forms are presented. 
Comments: The use of chemical profiling with high speed gas chromatography adds a 
new dimension and tool to cargo inspection technologies. By being able to chemically 
detect sample vapors and odor intensity from explosives, contraband drugs, hazardous 
chemicals, biological life and money, these sensors provide a reliable, fast and cost 
effective screening tool for CBP inspectors. This article is relevant to the study as it 
addresses and highlights research work in an area that is of concern to the United States 
Customs inspectors, and that is chemical and biological weapons detection. It is part of 
the data set for coding, and provides information reported in the Review of the Literature 
section of the paper. 
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Impact of Technology Deployment 
 
Bennett, A. & Chin, Y. (2008). 100% container scanning: security policy  
implications for global supply chains. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
Retrieved from 
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/45248 
 
Abstract: On August 3, 2007, President George Bush signed into law HR1 the 
"Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007." The 9/11 Act 
requires 100% scanning of US-bound containers at foreign seaports by 2012 through the 
use of non-intrusive (NII) and radiation detection equipment. Maritime stakeholders and 
the government community have actively debated the feasibility of this plan, citing 
economic impacts, barriers to global trade and insufficient technology and physical 
space. This thesis focuses on importer concerns relating to potential shipment delays, 
financial burdens, sourcing issues and contingency planning concerns in global supply 
chain operations. Using port statistics, field study data as well as industry insights, 
frameworks are developed to identify major stakeholder issues and quantify the financial 
costs and delay risks bourn across the entire supply chain. Cost and delay analyses are 
based on 2 prototypical ports - a small/low-volume export port and a large/high-volume 
export port. Cost analysis is performed for a consolidated (port authority) level 
installation and a segmented (terminal operator) level installation to calculate a per-box 
scanning fee. Queuing models and Monte-Carlo simulations are also developed to 
quantify truck congestion due to primary scanning and the risk of containers missing 
vessels due to secondary inspections. Results of the cost analysis indicate that scanning 
configurations, particularly related to NII, greatly affect the-per box scanning cost. It is 
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not economically feasible to scan only US-bound containers at half of the 600 ports with 
direct connections to the US. Analysis of truck congestion suggests that the ramp 
metering effect of the entry gate can help to abate congestion at the scanning area.  
Comments: The thesis is on the impact of screening inbound cargo containers on the 
global supply chain. The thesis addresses concerns relating to potential shipment delays, 
financial burdens, sourcing issues and contingency planning concerns. It is relevant to the 
study because it highlights the impact of deployed technology at the seaports as it relates 
to the description of the Audience of the study. The study is a master’s degree thesis, 
produced at MIT, and is thus deemed credible. 
 
HT Media. (2009). Sens. Lieberman, Collins reacts to limited progress on 100 percent  
percent cargo scanning at foreign ports. Retrieved from 
http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&org
Id=574&topicId=25151&docId=l:1090001615&isRss=true  
Abstract:  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that although Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) has been able to scan a majority of the cargo passing 
through low-volume ports, it has been able to scan no more than 5 percent of freight 
coming into large ports, necessitating an extension of the 2012 deadline for 100 percent 
scanning at major ports. 
Reacting to this news, United States Senator Susan Collins noted that "Under the SAFE 
Port Act, all cargo designated as high-risk at foreign ports is now scanned for radiation 
and X-rayed. In addition, all arriving cargo at every major U.S. seaport is scanned for 
radiation. These security measures currently in place are part of a layered, risked-based 
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method to help ensure that cargo entering the U.S. is safe, and, by extension, that the U.S. 
is kept safe. 
"This GAO report highlights the substantial challenges with attempting to scan all U.S.-
bound cargo containers at foreign ports with X-ray technology. Until this technology is 
proven effective at detecting radiological material and not disruptive of trade, requiring 
the scanning all U.S.-bound cargo, regardless of risk, at every foreign port is misguided 
and provides a false sense of security." 
Comments: The impact of this report by the GAO and the reaction from Senators Collins 
and Lieberman means continued funding by Congress for inspection technologies for use 
by the CBP at seaports of entry. The article and statements by the United States senators 
provide information on Congressional activities related to port security screening. As 
such, it supports development of the Purpose section of this paper. 
 
Kumar, S. & Verruso, J., (2008) Risk assessment for the security of inbound containers 
 at U.S. ports: a failure, mode, effects, and criticality analysis approach, 
 Transportation Journal, Retrieved from 
 http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/189552854.html 
Abstract: This study proposes a design of a decision support framework for a reliable 
cargo container shipment and handling system based on failure mode effect and criticality 
analysis for inbound containers at U.S. ports. The proposed prototype of a simple risk 
assessment system is offered that safeguards against potential security risks in cargo 
container shipments entering U.S. ports. An application of the proposed framework is 
presented--in a situation involving an inbound shipment from China designated for a U.S. 
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destination--that shows how effectively it helps reduce the risk of failure. Additionally, 
the industry research looks at how the initiatives being deployed affect supply chain 
managers as they contend with the changes and the associated costs faced by their 
businesses. 
Comments: This study proposes a risk assessment model for inbound cargo containers. It 
is conducted in line with the recommendations in the CSI and more in line with the 
supply chain than the impact of technology deployment. This article, published in a peer 
reviewed journal, provides background information for the Problem Area. 
Philips, B., Novikova, E., Wulf, E. & Kurfess, J. (2006). Comparison of shielded 
uranium passive gamma-ray detection methods, Naval Research Lab. 
Retrieved from http://spie.org/x648.html?product_id=666342 
Abstract: The detection of shielded special nuclear materials is of great concern to the 
homeland security community. It is a challenging task that typically requires large 
detectors arrays to achieve the required sensitivity to detect shielded enriched uranium. 
We simulated the performance of three different configurations of scintillation detectors 
in a realistic gamma ray background. The simulations were performed using the 
GEANT4 simulation package fine tuned for low energy photon transport. The background 
spectrum was obtained by modeling high-resolution background spectra obtained by 
various groups in various locations. The performance of a non-imaging scintillating array 
was compared to the performance of two imaging arrays: a coded aperture imager and a 
Compton imager. The sensitivity was modeled at three energies for the emission from a 1 
kg sphere of uranium enriched to 95% U-235: the 185 keV emission from U-235, the 
1001 keV emission from U-238, and the 2614 keV emission from U-232. The instruments 
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were modeled with and without passive shielding. The most detectable signal is the 2.614 
MeV emission from U-232 contamination if present at a level greater than tens of parts 
per trillion. While the non-imaging array has the highest efficiency, it also has the highest 
background rate and is therefore not the most sensitive instrument.  
Comments: The comparison of the detection methods in this work funded by the United 
States Naval Research Laboratories provides another relevant example of the impact of 
deployed technology at the seaports of entry. The simulations conducted on three gamma 
ray detectors and the results obtained are useful information in determining inspection 
technologies with the highest efficiency. Its relevance on the study is that by comparing 
the technologies highlighted in the purpose of the study, efficient technology that can 
effectively detect illicit cargo will be deployed.  It is part of the data set for coding, and 
provides information reported in the Review of the Literature section of the paper. 
 
Zhu, Y., Li, M., Young, C., Xie, M., & Elsayed, E., (2005). Impact of measurement 
error on container inspection policies at port-of-entry. Department 
of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Rutgers University. Retrieved 
from http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/TechnicalReports/TechReports/2009/2009-11.pdf 
Abstract: Containers and cargos arriving at port-of-entry are inspected using sensors and 
devices to detect drugs, weapons, nuclear materials and other illegal items. Measurement 
errors associated with the inspection process may result in higher percentage of 
misclassification of containers. In this paper, we propose and formulate three inspection 
policies for containers at port-of-entry assuming the presence of sensor measurement 
errors. The optimization of the policies is carried out and the performance of each in 
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terms of misclassification probabilities is compared. In each of the policies, the optimum 
settings are determined by minimizing the probability of false rejection while limiting the 
probability of false acceptance at a very low tolerance level. The results show that the 
policy of repeat inspections improves the performance in terms of correct container 
classification. 
Comments: This collaborative research project by a team of scientist from various 
universities and research laboratories examines the collection and analysis of information 
from different types of detectors utilized for inspecting inbound cargo containers at 
seaports of entry. The accuracy of inspections in terms of accepting or rejecting those 
containers affects the supply chain. The mathematical model they develop allows for 
evaluation and improvement of the process by comparing their performance to minimize 
misclassification and disruption to the inspection flow. Although the data provided 
cannot be corroborated, the article is part of the data set for coding, and the mathematical 
model is included in the list of potential technologies reported in the Review of the 
Literature section of the paper. 
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Review of the Literature 
 
The terrorist attacks in New York City and the events of September 11, 2001 heightened 
awareness about the vulnerability to terrorist attack of all modes of transportation (Fritelli, 2005). 
Fritelli (2005) further explains that the vulnerability of the maritime container supply chain to 
potential acts of terrorism has led to increased utilization of several container security 
technologies. The integrity of a container during its transport from point A to point B in the 
logistics chain cannot be assured. Given sufficient time, opportunity and a remote location, 
people will be able to open a container and tamper with its contents (van de Voort, O’Brien, 
Rahman & Valeri, 2003).  
The term “port security” serves as shorthand for the broad effort to secure the entire 
maritime supply chain, from the factory gate in a foreign country to the final destination in the 
United States (Haverman & Shatz, 2006). Container security is not primarily about port security; 
it is about everyplace security. Indispensable and ubiquitous, a container is an excellent vector, 
or carrier, for weapons of mass destructions (WMDs) such as nukes or “dirty bombs’ (Cohen, 
2005). There is no way to completely inspect all the millions of containers entering the United 
States. Given the difficulties of complete inspections, defense needs to be layered, with checks at 
multiple stages on a container’s journey. One of the layers is technology; technology – the use 
and development of new inspection and tracking technologies (Cohen, 2005). 
The purpose of this study is to document the technologies currently being used in support 
of closed container inspections, and identify the companies and organizations that are leading 
research efforts on developing new technologies. This Review of the Literature section is 
organized around three major themes. The first theme examines technologies currently being 
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used in support of closed container inspections for materials that could be used to make atomic 
weapons or other instruments of weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical 
weapons. The second theme is focused on companies and organizations leading research efforts 
on developing new technologies. The third theme looks at the impact of technology deployment 
in relation to the detection of dangerous and illegal cargo in closed container inspections. 
 
Theme 1: Current Technologies for Closed Container Inspections 
Three specific categories of security technology have been the focus of increased 
research, testing and deployment in recent years; non-intrusive inspection (gamma and x-ray 
imaging), radiation detection, and RFID container intrusion detection (Unisys Corp, 2007). For 
the purposes of this study, two of these widely used technologies at the seaports of entry are 
examined – non-intrusive inspection and radiation detection. 
Gamma-ray and X-ray Imaging. Non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology provides the 
capability to image the contents of containers without having to perform the time-consuming 
process of devanning a container and physically inspecting its contents (Unisys Corp, 2007). 
Active inspection systems have two requirements: (a) an interrogating source of radiation 
(a photon source) and (b) a means of detecting the characteristic object emissions. Numerous 
photon sources are available and include both gamma-ray (from atomic nucleus) and x-ray (from 
atomic structure) sources (Jones, 2003). Jones (2003) states that this dual requirement drives the 
need for higher photon beam energies with performance matched imaging detectors. Two of 
these higher energy systems are the SAIC VACISTM system and the Rapidscan (formerly 
ARACOR) EagleTM system.  
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As container-inspection technology advances, security authorities need to manage 
increasing amounts of information from non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems, radiation-
detection systems, and other sources — all without impeding the flow of traffic (SAIC, 2010). 
The SAIC VACIS® integrated container inspection system (ICIS) (see Figure 1) is designed to 
integrate and manage images and data. When these features are combined with high-speed 
scanning capabilities, the company claims that a single ICIS lane can handle more than 300 
containers per hour (SAIC, 2010). 
 
Figure 1.  SAIC Integrated Container Inspection System 
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Figure 2. The Rapidscan Eagle 
The Rapidscan Eagle, shown in Figure 2, is a mobile, cargo inspection unit providing 
real-time, radiographic imaging of large inspected items, including a cargo container at a port. 
The cargo image is acquired and displayed as the unit “drives over” the cargo container or other 
inspected item (Jones, 2003). 
The Rapidscan Eagle®, designed to meet the high x-ray imaging requirements for cargo 
inspection, employs a 9 mega volt linear accelerator x-ray generator and delivers 425 millimeters 
of steel penetration. As a result, these systems can inspect a wide range of cargo, including 
densely-loaded trucks and containers, thereby eliminating the need for costly and time-
consuming manual inspections. Trucks are automatically moved through a stationary x-ray beam 
on a cargo motion system. According to the company, an entire 20-foot container on a truck can 
be inspected in less than 30 seconds (Rapidscan, 2009). 
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Radiation Detection. VeriTainer container crane mounted radiation detection and 
identification system, called the VeriSpreaderTM, employs passive scanning technology and  
identification algorithms to detect and identify gamma and neutron sources in a shipping 
container as they are loaded or discharged from a container ship (see Figure 3) (VeriTainer, 
2009). The product is designed to integrate sensitive neutron and spectroscopic gamma ray 
detectors into a container crane spreader, which is the piece of the container crane that directly 
engages an intermodal shipping container as it is moved onto and off of a container ship at a 
container terminal (Redus, Alioto, Perry & Pantazis, 2007). 
 
Figure 3. Photograph of VeriSpreaderTM in use at the Port of Oakland, California 
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Theme 2: Research Efforts on Developing New Technologies 
The research work being done on advancing current screening technologies is focused on 
improving detection of neutron based explosives, and activation analysis. The advances range 
from the synchronous inspection of two sides of vehicles, increasing throughput and sensitivity 
and reducing imparted dose to the inspected object and its occupants (if any), to taking advantage 
of the neutron kinetic behavior of cargo as a way to remove systematic errors, thus reducing 
background effects and improving fast neutron signals (Gozani & Strellis, 2007). Stowsky 
(2005) states that the research emphasis in screening technology is in the area of so-called “smart 
screening” systems. The idea is to arm the screening machines with software that can detect anomalies and then automatically alert human operators to the need for further inspection and, perhaps, the need to instigate countermeasures. 
 
Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL). The Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory is a national security laboratory, whose mission is to advance and apply science and 
technology to: ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, reduce or 
counter threats to national and global security, enhance the energy and environmental security of 
the nation, and strengthen the nation’s economic competitiveness (Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, 2008). Working at this intersection of commerce and national security, Lawrence 
Livermore researchers are applying their expertise in radiation science and detection to develop 
improved technologies for detecting hidden radioactive materials.  
One new technology being designed and tested at the laboratory is a neutron interrogation 
system for cargo containers. According to Sprouse (2004), this system will quickly screen 
incoming shipments to ensure that nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched 
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uranium (HEU) are not smuggled into the United States. Sprouse (2004) further explains that the 
design for the detector system calls for a belowground neutron generator that would bathe 
containerized cargo with neutrons (see Figure 4). Interaction of the neutrons with fissile material 
inside the container would produce fission, followed by delayed gamma rays detected by an 
array of liquid scintillators as the container moves through the system. A scintillator is a material 
that emits light when particles traverse it, and a scintillator instrument detects and measures 
gamma radiation by counting the light flashes (scintillations) induced by the radiation. 
 
Figure 4. Belowground neutron generator 
Simultaneously, efforts are moving forward to develop a large array of liquid scintillators 
that are sensitive to both neutron and gamma rays. Liquid scintillator is a good candidate 
material for the cargo interrogation problem. It has a fast response time, and it can be 
inexpensively instrumented to scan a large volume of material, which helps to ensure that a large 
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fraction of the particle flux emitted by the neutron-irradiated nuclear material will be detected 
(Sprouse, 2004). Livermore physicist Adam Bernstein, who leads the detector design team, says, 
“Neutrons and gamma rays create a 20-nanosecond pulse of blue light when they scatter in the 
medium, and this fluorescent pulse can be detected in photomultiplier tubes” (Sprouse, 2004). 
Such detectors can be used in various cargo detection and interrogation scenarios. For example, 
even with the neutron source off, the detector array may still be sensitive enough to scan cargo 
for some types of radioactive materials of concern. 
 Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The Idaho National Laboratory, operated for the 
United States Department of Energy by Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA), has a mission to ensure 
the nation's energy security with safe, competitive, and sustainable energy systems and unique 
national and homeland security capabilities (Idaho National Laboratory, 2009). The Pulsed 
Photoneutron Assessment (PPA) technology is being developed at the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to address nuclear material detection within 
cargo containers. This technology uses the high penetration capability of energetic photons (up to 
12 million electric volts) from a pulsed, linear electron accelerator to induce fissions in nuclear 
materials. The resulting delayed neutron emissions are measured between each accelerator pulse 
to detect the nuclear material contents, and variations in the electron beam energy can allow 
nuclear material identification (Jones, 2003). Jones (2003) further states that current research is 
directed toward the detection of nuclear smuggling, especially very difficult-to-detect Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU), and explosives within trucks and cargo containers.  
The prototype neutron and gamma-ray detection system consists of a transportable stand 
consisting of an array of nine detector pairs at various elevations. Each collocated pair consists of 
a neutron and gamma-ray detector. Figure 5 shows a detector assembly positioned alongside a 
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maritime-cargo container in a testing device at the Idaho Accelerator Center that provides 
container motion. 
 
Figure 5.  Deployed PPA detector assembly 
The Lab reports that evolving research and development will incorporate other WMD 
interests, which will enable enhanced applications with higher beam energy operations. The goal 
is to provide a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding and evaluation for greater 
standoff distance interrogation applications. Technology is being designed that will investigate 
smaller quantities of nuclear material detection, and will support adversarial analyses for various 
threat scenarios. 
Electronic Sensor Technology. Electronic Sensor Technology, Inc. has developed and 
patented a chemical vapor analysis process. This process applies gas chromatography 
calculations and technology toward a wide variety of industries, including Homeland Security, 
Life Sciences, Chemical and Petrochemical, Food and Beverage and Environmental. The process 
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works through application of rapid analysis of chemical odors and vapors, and helps to provide 
real-time analysis (Electronic Sensor Technology, 2009). 
Ultra-high speed gas chromatography is an analytical method that can be applied to 
analysis of odors, fragrances, and chemical vapors produced by explosives, chemical and 
biological weapons, contraband, and hazardous industrial materials (Staples, 2006). Using a 
solid-state surface-acoustic-wave (SAW) sensor with electronically variable sensitivity, it 
identifies the chemical species in the vapors inside cargo containers and determines their 
concentrations in 10 seconds with picogram sensitivity (see Figure 6). 
Vapors within the container are sampled by inserting a sampling tube attached to the inlet of the 
instrument through a small opening in the container door, or through the ventilation ducts of the 
container. 
According to Staples (2006), although the system is useful for sampling any accessible 
container, it currently holds immediate significance for America’s ports. An important 
requirement for a chemical-profiling system is that it recognizes odors and fragrances on the 
basis of their full chemical signature, the combination of all the chemicals in an odor, which is 
unique to each substance producing the odor. Unlike a trace detector, it must see everything and 
miss nothing (Staples, 2006). 
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Figure 6.  Direct sampling and chemical analysis of odors within a cargo container 
 
Theme 3: Impact of Technology Deployment 
In assessing the impact of deployed technology at the nation’s seaports, the focus is on 
two areas; (a) impact on the logistics and international supply chain, and (b) the effectiveness of 
the deployed technologies. 
Logistics and the international supply chain. As mentioned in the Audience section of 
this study, customs brokers, clearing agents, logistics planners, purchasing, and manufacturing 
managers all have an interest in movement of goods and potential disruptions to the international 
supply chain. The events of September 11, 2001 led to the implementation by the United States 
Customs and Border Protection of a strategic program known as the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI). The purpose of the CSI is to secure what is believed to be the most vulnerable but 
indispensable link in the global supply chain: the ocean going container (Banomyong, 2005).  
CSI consists of four core elements: (a) Identify high-risk containers. CBP uses automated 
targeting tools to identify containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance 
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information and strategic intelligence; (b) Prescreen and evaluate containers before they are 
shipped. Containers are screened as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of 
departure; (c) Use detection technology to prescreen high-risk containers to ensure that screening 
can be done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade. This technology includes 
large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices; and (d) Use smarter, 
more secure containers, which will allow CBP officers at United States ports of arrival to 
identify containers that have been tampered with during transit (U.S. Department of State, 2009). 
With the CSI in place, much of the concern from importers relates to potential delays to 
the supply chain due to the use of detection technology at the ports of entry. Bennett and Chin 
(2008) state that there are also concerns about innocent alarms. Gerald Epstein, a homeland 
security expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, commented, “There are an 
awful lot of things that are radioactive out there… if all you’re doing is looking at the total 
amount of radiation, you are going to be opening up a lot of boxes and finding kitty litter” (p.31). 
In interviews conducted by Bennett and Chin (2008) with several of the top 10 importers in the 
United States to get a better understanding of their opinions on current security programs, the 
majority of the importers state that delays are not currently an issue in the maritime 
transportation mode even with these additional new initiatives. Sporadic delays have occurred 
due to increased scanning and inspection, but are not yet of great concern (p.43). 
Effectiveness of deployed technologies Containers arriving at a port-of-entry are 
inspected to prevent entry of undesired cargo such as illegal weapons, drugs, and dangerous 
material. Each container has several attributes and the presence of one or more of the attributes 
may lead to additional inspection that may require examining the contents of the container 
manually. The attributes may include radioactive material, biological and chemical agents, drugs 
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and illegal weapons (Zhu, Li, Young, Xe & Elsayed, 2005). Zhu et al. (2005) advocate three 
policies that could mitigate misclassification errors in the deployed technologies. One policy 
capable of improving performance is to use more precise sensors in repeat measurements, which 
reduce the impact of measurement errors. This policy assumes that the measurement errors can 
be controlled and decreased in subsequent inspections. 
Philips, Novikova, Wulf and Kurfess (2006) simulated the performance of three different 
configurations of scintillation detectors in a realistic gamma ray background. The performance of 
a non-imaging scintillating array was compared to the performance of two imaging arrays: a 
coded aperture imager and a Compton imager. It was found that while the non-imaging array had 
the highest efficiency; it also had the highest background rate and was therefore not the most 
sensitive instrument. 
Gamma-rays can typically penetrate six inches of steel. The resolution of the gamma-ray 
images is sufficient to confirm empty containers, show the general shape of cargo, and identify 
anomalies in lightly-loaded containers. In comparison, x-rays are capable of penetrating roughly 
twelve inches of steel.  The resolution of x-rays is much greater than that of gamma-rays and is 
able to give a much more detailed picture of a container, particularly when the container is 
heavily-loaded (Cirincione, Cosmas, Low, Pech & Wilds, 2007). 
Bjorkholm (2006) notes that the most common imaging characteristics that are quoted for 
these systems are penetration, contrast detail and resolution. Ultimate penetration is a common 
measure of a system’s ability to image a given thick object, but it must be considered in 
conjunction with the contrast sensitivity and the spatial resolution, which determine detection. In 
general, the contrast detail is worst for the gamma systems and improves for X-ray systems as 
the end point of the spectrum increases. 
 
   Port Security Technology 61 
 
The effectiveness of the detection technologies has received mixed reviews. O’Harrow 
(2008) reported in the Washington Post that the current machines are effective at detecting the 
presence of radiation but often cannot distinguish benign sources, such as cat litter, from 
materials that can be used in weapons. Biesecker (2009) cites a GAO report that says the 
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP), which is the new technology being developed to 
passively scan containers for the presence of radioactive materials, "were frequently able to 
detect certain nuclear materials when shielding was below threat guidance, and both systems had 
difficulty detecting such materials when shielding was somewhat greater than threat guidance" 
(p.1). 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to present the evolving efforts and the uses of various 
technologies in support of closed container inspections of goods and materials that pass through 
US seaports, as a way to address and minimize the disruption to the international supply chain. 
The study seeks to (a) document the technologies currently being used in support of closed 
container inspections (Stana, 2006) and (b) identify the companies and organizations leading 
research efforts on developing new technologies (Stana, 2006).  
Technology is merely one part of the total overarching strategy for homeland security 
(Makarski & Marrero, 2002).  For seaports of entry, other factors are also necessary for process 
efficiency, such as United States Congressional policy, and the cooperation between the United 
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and industry on programs such as the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism that encourages shippers and carriers to implement security 
plans and measures to promote greater security at all points along the supply chain in exchange 
for expediting of customs procedures. 
The United States faces three key challenges to implementing efforts to improve the 
security of ports and containers: (a) creating and enforcing a set of security standards, (b) 
ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with competing interests when it comes to the 
specifics of how things are to be done, and (c) paying the increased security bill (Hecker, 2002). 
The challenges faced in implementing the goal of 100% screening of all inbound containers 
using these technologies seem almost endless, but they can be summarized generally into the 
following themes, that form a basis of this study. 
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Technologies in Current Use to Support Closed Container Inspections 
 
The potential threat of terrorists using containers as a way to smuggle a nuclear or 
radiological device inside a cargo container poses a large risk to our economies and to our 
societies (van de Voort, O’Brien, Rahman, & Valeri, 2003).  The current technologies being used 
at the seaports of entry to detect dangerous cargo are not perfect or foolproof, but they are 
steadily improving in accuracy and reliability. Non-intrusive (gamma and x-ray) technology 
provide the capability to image the contents of containers without opening them. This technology 
is widely used and has benefited customs inspectors, but requires significant human operator 
involvement (Unisys Corp, 2007). Radiation detection technology is also a key tool, but is 
hampered by nuisance alarm rates that reduce its effectiveness. None-the-less, there are 
documented benefits of radiation scanning to government entities, including port authorities and 
customs inspectors, which include: (a) prevention of an act of terrorism, (b) meeting mandates 
and requirements established by domestic government entities for the radiation scanning of 
containers, and (c) providing assurances to the local community and port workers as to the 
security of cargo containers (Unisys Corp, 2007). 
 
Organizations Leading Research Efforts 
 
The various companies and research institutions developing these technologies are 
focused on the development of an integrated technology that is efficient, is able to detect or deter 
terrorist or criminal threats, and satisfies the needs of the United States Customs and Border 
Protection agents and field inspectors who are responsible for screening inbound cargo 
containers. The technologies currently being developed include: (a) electronic sensors for the 
analysis of odors, fragrances, and chemical vapors produced by explosives, chemical and 
biological weapons, contraband, and hazardous industrial materials (Staples, 2006); (b) pulsed, 
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linear electron accelerator to induce fissions in nuclear materials resulting in delayed neutron 
emissions that are measured between each accelerator pulse to detect the nuclear material 
contents (Jones, 2003), and (c) the neutron interrogation system for cargo containers which will 
quickly screen incoming shipments to ensure that nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) are not smuggled into the United States (Sprouse, 2004), when 
deployed,  will enhance detection of illicit cargo entering the United States. 
 
The Impact of Technology Deployment 
  Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the primary focus of port security 
was to prevent theft and to ensure that illegal or undeclared goods were not brought into the 
United States. The United States and international responses to the terrorist threat have expanded 
the focus of port security. Scanning equipment has enhanced security by enabling the detection 
of weapons at ports of entry, thereby preventing their transport onto the mainland by truck or 
train (Haverman & Shatz, 2006).  
Martonosi, Ortiz and Willis (2006) explain that complete scanning and subsequent 
inspection of containers at ports would most likely deter terrorists and smugglers under particular 
circumstances (see Table 1: Cargo scan location consequence matrix). A sufficiently high 
detection rate would render irrational an attempt to employ a container in an attack on an interior 
target, since it would have little chance of reaching the desired location (p.22). Haveman and 
Shatz (2006) further explain: 
“the burden thus falls on technology - on the intelligent deployment of existing 
technologies and the rapid development of new and better technologies. Used in 
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conjunction with one another, rather than as replacements for one another, they could 
provide an excellent, although regrettably still imperfect, security shield (p.121).”  
The transformation of ships into floating warehouses, a consequence of just-in-time 
manufacturing strategies, combined with the digital transformation of supply chain management, 
has also rendered economies more vulnerable to terrorist disruption (Stowsky, 2005). Due to the 
impact of technology deployment on logistics and the international supply chain, the expectation 
is that better screening technologies will also reduce commercial losses from fraud by enabling 
the quicker detection of illegal or dangerous goods and their removal from the supply chain 
(Haveman & Shatz, 2006). 
 
 
Table 1. Cargo scan location consequence matrix 
 
However, more research must be done in the area of seaport cargo transportation security. 
A key area for further development is the transport chain for containers, which is currently quite 
fragmented and involves many different organizations (Haverman & Shatz, 2006). It is not 
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sufficiently transparent, that is, the flow of information accompanying the flow of containers is 
not good.  
But, early provisions of more complete information and greater access control have been 
put in place by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection service (Haverman & Shatz, 2006). As 
an example, ocean carriers are now required to send the U.S. CBP the manifest for each 
container, electronically, in a standard, machine-readable format, 24 hours before loading at a 
foreign port (Haverman & Shatz, 2006).  Continued improvement in the ability to detect terrorist 
nuclear weapons in the maritime transportation system, designed to make a terrorist attack on a 
port less likely to succeed, may in fact make such attacks less probable. 
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Appendix B 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
9-11:  11 September 2001 (Date of worst terrorist attack in U.S. history) 
ACS:  Automated Commercial Systems 
The Automated Commercial System (ACS) is the comprehensive system used by 
the U.S. Customs Service to track, control, and process all commercial goods 
imported into the United States. 
 
ARPA  Advanced Research Projects Agency 
  (Agency of the United States Department of Defense) 
 
ATS:  Automated Targeting System 
ATS is an intranet-based enforcement and decision support tool that is the 
cornerstone for all CBP targeting efforts. 
 
ACI:  Ancore Cargo Inspector 
CBP:  United States Customs and Border Protection 
The U.S. federal agency in charge of customs and border management and 
protection for the United States. 
 
CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
CBSA  Canadian Border Services Agency 
  (Canadian Customs Services) 
CIS:  Container Inspection System 
CSD:  Container Screening Device 
CST:  Container Scanning Technology 
CSI:  Container Security Initiative 
A U.S. Customs and Border Protection program with four core elements: using 
intelligence and automated information to identify and screen high-risk 
containers; inspecting containers identified as high-risk, at the point of departure; 
using detection technology to quickly inspect high-risk containers; and using 
smarter, tamper-evident containers. It is best known for screening and inspecting 
containers at foreign ports. 
 
C-TPAT: Customs- Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
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A joint government business initiative that encourages shippers and carriers to 
implement security plans and measures to promote greater security at all points 
along the supply chain in exchange for expediting of customs procedures. 
 
DHS:  Department of Homeland Security 
The U.S. federal department in charge of the national network of organizations 
responsible for U.S. homeland security. 
 
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
An office within the DHS whose mission is to detect and report unauthorized 
attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological 
material for use against the United States. 
 
DOE:  Department of Energy 
The U.S. federal department whose mission is to advance the national, economic, 
and energy security of the United States; to promote scientific and technological 
innovation in support of that mission; and to ensure the environmental cleanup of 
the national nuclear weapons complex.  
 
DOT:  Department of Transportation 
  The U.S. federal department in charge of the transportation system. 
   
 
EDS:  Explosion Detection System 
FRR:  False Rejection Rate 
GAO:  Government Accountability Office 
The non-partisan agency in charge of studying the programs and expenditures of 
the U.S. federal government. Formerly known as the General Accounting Office. 
 
HR:  House Resolution 
ICE:  Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
  (Agency of the United States government) 
 
IPSP:  International Port Security Program 
ISC:  International Supply Chain 
  The transport and logistics system (organizations, people, technology, 
activities, information and resources) for the world's cargo. 
 
IT:  Information Technology 
The use of computers and software (or any technology) to process, convert, store, 
retrieve, transmit or communicate information. 
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LFMI:  Low Frequency Magnetic Imaging 
NII:  Non-Intrusive Inspection 
POE:  Port of Entry 
PFNA:  Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis 
R&D:  Research and Development 
RDE:  Radiation Detection Equipment 
RIID:  Radiation Isotope Identification Device 
RPM:  Radiation Portal Monitor 
A broad category of radiation detection equipment, some types of which are being 
implemented at U.S. seaports. 
 
RST:  Radiation Screening Technology 
SAFE  
Port Act:  Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 
 
SAIC  Science Applications International Corporation 
  (Organization) 
 
SPIE  The International Society for Optical Engineering 
TNA:  Thermal Neutron Analysis 
TSA:  Transportation Security Administration 
A U.S. Department of Homeland Security agency responsible for protecting the 
nation’s transportation systems. 
 
USCS:  United States Customs Service 
  (Agency of the United States government) 
 
USCG: United States Coast Guard 
One of the five U.S. military branches; responsible for maritime and coastal 
security as well as various humanitarian and law enforcement duties. It is a part of 
the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
WMD:  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
  Nuclear, biological, radiological, or chemical weapons. 
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Appendix C 
 
Search Results 
 
 
Search Engine Search Terms Results Quality of Results 
Worldcat Container Scanning 
Technology 
143 Fair 
 Container Port Security 57 Poor 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
80 Poor 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
1023 Good 
 Container Inspection System 260 Fair 
 Scanning Systems 5520 Poor 
Container Security Initiative 
 
56 Good  
 
Homeland Security 13,265 Poor 
EBSCO HOST  
Academic Search 
Premier 
Container Scanning 
Technology 
39 Good 
 Container Port Security 128 Good 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
14 Poor 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
10 Excellent 
 Container Inspection System 74 Fair 
 Scanning Systems 5432 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 164 Good 
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Homeland Security 9262 Poor 
 Container Scanning 
Technology 
16 Good 
Google Scholar Container Port Security 45,000 Poor 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
62,000 Poor 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
19,900 Good 
 Container Inspection System 146,000 Good 
 Scanning Systems 2,700,000 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 28,300 Poor 
 
 
Homeland Security 424,000 Poor 
 Container Scanning 
Technology 
2 Poor 
FirstSearchECO Container Port Security 7 Excellent 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
1 Good 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
1 Good 
 Container Inspection System 10 Fair 
 Scanning Systems 2112 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 5 Good 
 
 
Homeland Security 556 Poor 
 Container Scanning 1000 Poor 
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Technology 
LexisNexis Academic Container Port Security 1000 Poor 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
200 Fair 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
97 Good 
 Container Inspection System 454 Good 
 Scanning Systems 998 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 1000 Fair 
 
 
Homeland Security 1000 Poor 
 Container Scanning 
Technology 
4 Good 
Web of Science Container Port Security 10 Excellent 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
3 Poor 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
6 Excellent 
 Container Inspection System 54 Fair 
 Scanning Systems 18,758 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 3 Excellent 
 
 
Homeland Security 876 Poor 
UO Libraries Catalog Container Scanning 
Technology 
0 Poor 
 Container Port Security 5 Good 
 Container Screening 0 Poor 
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Technology 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
2 Poor 
 Container Inspection System 1 Excellent 
 Scanning Systems 42 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 3 Excellent 
 
 
Homeland Security 2267 Poor 
CQ Researcher Container Scanning 
Technology 
3 Excellent 
 Container Port Security 14 Fair 
 Container Screening 
Technology 
7 Good 
 Non-Intrusive Inspection 
Technology 
1 Poor 
 Container Inspection System 15 Poor 
 Scanning Systems 41 Poor 
 Container Security Initiative 18 Fair 
 
 
Homeland Security 208 Fair 
 
 
 
 
  
 
